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IN THE. SUPREME. COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOWELL V. PARRISH, EMILY 
L. PARRISH, his wife, V ADAL 
PETERSON, and MELVA 
PETERSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appeltants, 
-vs.-
HARLOW G. RlC'HARDS and MRS. 
HARLOW G. RICHARDS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8690 
This was an action to enjoin maintenance of a 
structure and fence built in violation of a real property 
restrictive covenant ,and a Salt Lake City ordinance (R. 
1-4). From a judgment of dismissal, no cause of action 
(R. 204), plaintiffs appeal (R. 211). 
The parties are owners of real property located 
within N orthcrest Subdivision, an exclusive residential 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
area located high in the avenues of Salt Lake City. The 
properties owned by the parties are contiguous and are 
located in the 600 block of "I" Street. Plaintiffs Peter-
son's ,own p,roperty is located at 671 "I" Street; defen-
dants' property is located immediately to the north at 
685 "I" Street; and the p,roperty of the plaintiffs Parrish 
is immediately to the north of that, at 699 "I" Street. 
Immediately to the west of defendants' Northcrest prop-
erty is a strip of land 15.2 feet wide located outside the 
N orthcre.st subdivision (Findings No. 2 and 3, R. 195-
196). 
The subdivider of N orthcrest, prior to acquisition of 
the properties by the parties to this action, had recorded 
a restrictive covenant relating to the uses to which prop-
erties in the subdivision might be put (Exhibit 2). The 
covenant contained the following paragraph: 
"USE OF LAND: Each lot in said subdi-
vision is here by designated as a re.sidential lot, 
and none of the said lots shall be improved, used 
or occupied for other than private single family 
residence purposes~ and no flat or apartment 
house intended for residence purposes shall be 
erected thereon, and no structure ~hall be erected 
or placed on any of said lots other than a one, 
t"To, or three ear garage, and one single family 
d'velling, not to exeeed one story in height, except 
that on tho~e lots "There the finished ground 
8h•va tion i~ at least one story lo,Yer on one side 
or thf\ d\\TPlling than on the opposite side, the 
d'vPlling n1ay extend t\\To stories above the 
f.iuisbPd ground elevntion on such lo,Yer side/' 
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The "Restriction Agreement" also contained pro-
visions regulating the width of front and side lots; pro-
hibiting further subdivision, conduct of trade or business, 
nuisances, existence of temporary buildings, and the 
keeping of certain animals or fowls; establishing mini-
mum floor space; and conferring upon owners of the 
various lots the right to enforce the agreement. 
The S.alt Lake City Revised Ordinances of 1955 con-
tain a provision regulating the height of fences. Section 
51-4-4 reads as follows: 
"No fence or wall or other similar structure 
shall be erected in any required front yard as de-
fined herein to a height in excess of four ( 4) feet; 
nor shall any fence or wall or other similar struc-
ture be erected in any side or rear y.ard to a height 
in excess of six ( 6) feet. Where there is a differ-
ence in the grade of the properties on either side, 
of the fence or wall, the height of the fence or wall 
shall be measured from the average grade of the 
adjoining properties." 
On about February 18, 1954, defendants were con-
sidering building a tennis court upon their lot. They 
discussed the building restrictions with Lynn S. Rich-
ards, Willard R. Smith .and 1\tfr. and Mrs. Vincent Rees; 
a few days later they discussed the project with plain-
tiffs (Interrogatory No. 10, R. 16, 18). The plaintiffs 
protested construction of the tennis court. On March 22, 
1954, they sent a letter to Dr. Richard.s outlining their 
reasons for opposing construction of the tennis court 
and enclosing an opinion from the Salt Lake City law 
firm of Dickson, Ellis, Parsons & McCre.a that con-
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struction of the tennis court would violate the restrictive 
covenant and would require a permit for construction of 
a fence more than six feet in height (Exhibit 15). 
Although nothing was done immediately about 
building the tenni.s court, the plan ap,parently remained. 
On about July 20, 1955, construction of the tennis court 
began (Interrogatory No. 9, R. 16, 18). On August 2, 
1955, counsel for the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants, 
telling them that the plaintiffs intended to take every 
possible step to prevent construction of the tennis court 
(Exhibit 14). 
The tennis court was located in the southwest corner 
of the defendants' properties ju.st inside the south and 
west boundaries (Interrogatory No. 13, R. 16, 19). The 
dimensions of the court are 78 by 36 feet, surrounded by 
a fence having dimensions of 100 by 50 feet (Interroga-
tory Nos. 12, 15, R. 16, 19). Prior to construction of the 
tennis court the defendants had changed the contours of 
their property, raising the property level various dis-
tances from 6 inches at the \Yest end to 36 inches at a 
point approximately 45 feet west of the east boundary. 
A retaining \vall \Yas constructed a few feet north of, and 
exceeding the height of a retaining ,v-all already existing 
on the Peterson boundary (Interrogator)~ No. 18, R. 16, 
19; R. 141). Atop the retaining \Yall the defendants 
erected a six-foot high ehain link fence (Interrogatory 
No. 15, R. 16, 19). The tennis court and fence rise above 
the Peterson property~ they separate the Parrish prop-
erty fron1 the valley belo\v (Exhibits 8 and 9). 
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The properties of the parties are located on hilly 
terrain which slope.s downward from North to South. 
Prior to construction a certain amount of leveling was 
necessary (R. 139, 140). The top of the defendants' pre-
sent retaining wall is somewhat above the "natural'' 
grade. The evidence, with reference to the present grade, 
shows that the top of defendants' retaining wall is a.p'-
proximaJtely four f.eet above the Peterson lawn (R. 108) 
and about two and one-half feet above the Peterson re-
taining wall at one point (R. 149). The six foot chain 
link fence is located upon the retaining wall (R. 104). 
Existence of the tennis court and fence diminishes the 
value of plaintiffs' properties (R. 110, 130-133). 
Defendants were permitted to show that certain 
other owners within N orthcrest Subdivision had con-
structed swimming pools and high fences (R. 167-178), 
but there is no evidence that the character of the neigh-
borhood has been changed by the swimming pools or 
fences. Mr. Richards didn't know how many house.s there 
were in Northcrest Subdivision (R. 178). It was shown, 
also, that the Petersons, together with their neighbor to 
the west, erected a temporary chain link fence which, to-
gether with the retaining wall, exceeds the height of six 
feet (R. 118-119) ; and thrut Parrish, with the consent of 
the neighbor to the north, has a short length of fence 
which may exceed six feet in height above the pre.sent 
grade (R. 144, 185-186). The trial court held that these 
facts were sufficient to estop the plaintiffs from assert-
ing that the defendants' fence violates the Salt Lake City 
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ordinance and that the defendants' structure violates 
the restriction agreement ( R. 201) . 
STATEMEN'T OF POINTS 
1. The defendants' tennis court is prohibited by the 
re.striction agreement for N orthcrest Subdivision. 
2. The defendants' chain link fence is prohibited by 
the Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances of 1955, Section 
51-4-4. 
3. The court erred in applying the doctrine of estop-
pel as against the plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
'THE DEFENDANTS' TENNIS COURT IS PROHIBITED 
BY ~THE RESTRICTION AGREEMENT FOR NORTH·CREST 
SUBDIVISION. 
There is no dispute as to the language of the coven-
ant. It provides that "no flat or apartment" and "no 
structure shall be erected or placed on any of said lots" 
other than one gar.age and a single-fan1ily d\Yelling. The 
court below took the vie"~ that the tennis court con-
structed and 1naint.ained by the defendants is not a ~~struc­
ture", and, that if it is, the Parrish high board fence is, 
too ( Conelu.sions 6 and 7, R. 202, 203). 
There is no doubt that the grantor n1eant to pro-
hibit son1cth in!J. Did he 1nean only to prohibit things 
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"like apartments"~ Or did he me1an to permit only 
hou.ses with g.arages ~ 
Ca.ses construing the word "building" have found it 
broad enough to include many things besides houses. 
We submit that the word "structure" has a broader mean-
ing than the word "building" and that certain things 
which are not properly "buildings" may be "structures" 
within the usually accepted meaning, and within the 
meaning of the grantors involved in this case. Katsoff 
v. Lucertini (1954), 141 Conn. 7 4, 103 A. 2d 812, 814. 
The case.s construing the meaning of the word "building" 
are, therefore, relevant but not controlling. In construing 
the meaning of the words used in a restrictive covenant 
the apparent me.aning of the word "user" must be con-
sidered. Katsoff v. LucertiniJ Supra. 
In the present case the following appear to be im-
portant: The subdivision is an exclusive residential area; 
buildings must be .set hack at least twenty-five feet from 
the front line and eight feet from the side lot line; 
nothing may be done on the lots "which may be or become 
an annoyance or a nuisance to the neighborhood; the 
lots are only moderate in size; and the restrictions were 
meant to enhance the value of the properties. It was 
apparently meant to enhance the value of all the prop-
erties; admittedly a structure in violation of the coven-
ant might enhance the v.alue of the offending property 
while causing depreciation in the value of the other prop-
erties. 
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There are many cases ap,plying various type,s of 
restrictions to various types of structures. While none 
have been found which are on all fours with the present 
case, many are enlightening. 
In Hulett v. Borough of Sea Girt (1930), 150 Atl. 
202, 106 N. J. Eq. 118, it was held that the word "struc-
ture" as used in a deed should be taken to mean some-
thing that will interfere with the u.se of the street or will 
obstruct the view. 
And in Kararek v. Peier (1900), 22 Wash. 419, 61 
Pac. 33, 50 L.R.A. 345, it was held that a structure "is 
any production or piece of work artificially built up or 
composed of parts joined together in some definite 
manner and in such a sense a fence is a structure." In 
construing a zoning ordinance the Supreme Court of 
Michigan held that a structure is "any production or 
piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts 
joined together in .some definite manner." C. K. Eddy, et 
al. v. Tierney, et. al. (1936), 276 ~{ich. 233, 267 N.W. 852, 
855; Detroit Trust Co. v. Austin 1939, 291 Mich. 523, 289 
N.W. 239. 
A number of cases construing restrieti\e coven-
ants as relating to fenees and "~ans are found in an 
annotation in 23 A.L.R. 2d 937 et seq.; and an annotation 
on covenants relating to "buildings'' is found in 49 A.L.R. 
1364 et seq. 
In this ease the defendants haYe constructed a 
1nas1sive concrete structure. I~t is bounded on three sides 
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by substantial re.rbaining walls. On the north the retain-
ing walls protrude upw.ard from the court. On the west 
and south they sup·port the court. Conneeted to these 
massive retaining wall1s is a large apron of concrete-. 
Attached to that are steel pos~ts and a ch~ain link fence 
on some sides and a concrete w.all on others. The struc-
ture as constructed has a foundartion, retbaining walls, 
and certainly goes beyond merely an ~apron of concrete. 
The nature of what has been constructed i1s best deis .. 
cribed by reference to the various photographs which 
were in evidence. We respectfully submit that the 
"thing" constructed is a structure within the me~Rning 
of the restrictive covenant. 
There is a very recent Utah case, Hargraves v. 
Young (1956), 3 Utah 2d 175, 280 P. 2d 974, which was 
conce·rned with a definition of structures. The court there 
held that .a canopy was a structure within the meaning 
of certain city ordinances. A pi0ture of the canopy is 
reported with the case, and we submit that the "thing" 
constructed by the defendants as shown by the pictures 
in evidence· in this case is a structure within the me'an-
ing of Hargraves v. Young. 
II 
THE DEFENDANTS' CHAIN LINK FENCE IS PRO-
HIBITED BY 'THE SALT LAKE CI:Ty REVISED OR.DI-
NANCES OF 1955, SECTION 51-4-4. 
It is undisputed that the chain link fence erected by 
defendants is six feet in height-e·xclusive of the retain-
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ing wall upon which it .stands. The evidence also estab-
lishes that the retaining wall, at some points, is as much 
as thirty-six inches higher than the natural grade of the 
land; and that the retaining wall of defendants is about 
four feet high when measured from the Peterson lawn 
(R. 108, Exhibits 3 through 10); it is also about four feet 
higher than the sidewalk it intersects. 
Section 51-4-4 of the 1955 ordinances of Salt Lake 
City provides that side yard fences shall not exceed the 
height of six feet. It also provides that ""~here there is a 
difference in the grade of the properties on either side of 
the fence" the height of the fence ' 11 shall be measured from 
the average grade of the adjoining properties." The ordi-
nance does not define "average grade"-but it is rea.son-
able to construe it to mean the average between the two 
innnediately adjacent parcels of property, that is, the 
grade "-ithin a fe,,~ feet of the fence. So construed the 
ordinance is purposeful: if construed to mean that the 
aYerage is deter1nined by adding together all elevations 
present in the neighboring parcels and dividing them by 
the nu1nber of elevations~ the ordinance is not only un-
"~orkahle but serYes no purpose. ·The average grade is 
i1nportant "~hen one property is innnediately do"\\rnhill 
fron1 anotlH'r. ,, ... ithout an average grade provision one 
property o\\-ner could be con1pletely dominated by vrhat 
Ill<'a~ures out .as a six foot fence. Unless a·v·erage grade is 
taken to r(.'fer to the inunediate difference in the adjoin-
ing properti(~s, a. property o\rner "'"ould be able to use 
high land on the north of his property as a basis for con-
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Btructing .a fifteen or twenty foot fence on the south of hls 
property. The ordinance would then become-as defend-
ants would have us believe it is~an absurdity offering 
no protection to downhill owners. 
The record, with its devotion to testimony about 
natural grades and cuts and fills, tends to obscure a very 
real fact about the defendants' property and their fence. 
The retaining wall rises about four feet above the Peter-
son lawn; ·and the six foot fence sits atop the wall. The 
Petersons thus encounter what is, from their point of 
view, a ten foot fence. For them it has all the character-
istics of a ten foot fence. 
We believe the ordinance was meant to protect a 
downhill owner, and to protect him against fences built 
upon property the way it exists at the time the fence is 
built. But even if the natural grade is considered im-
portant, the testimony of defendants' own witness, 
Georgius Y. Cannon, shows that the fence rises more than 
six feet above the natural grade. 
The defendants' retaining wall is higher than the 
sidewalk at a point where an exten.sion of the retaining 
wall would meet the sidewalk. We believe the sidew.alk 
represents, roughly, the "average grade" between the 
two properties. An earlier Salt Lake City Ordinance, 
Section 6713 of the Revised Ordinances of 1944, seems 
to bear this out. This section defines the terms "estab-
lished grade" and "grade" to mean "the elevation of the 
.sidewalk .at the center of that wall adjoining the street." 
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Under the evidence the court erred in failing to find 
that the defendants' fence is more than six feet above the 
average grade of the adjoining properties, and that it 
violates the ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
III 
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING 'THE DOCTRINE 
OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. 
The trial court ruled that the existence of a high 
board fence on the Parrish property, and a high link 
fence on the rear of the Peterson property, estopped the 
plaintiffs from asserting that the defendants' fence vio-
lates the zoning ordinance (R. 201). The court also ruled 
that if the tennis court was a "structure", so was the 
high board fence maintained by plaintiff Parrish, and 
that all the plaintiffs, because of the high board fence, 
are estopped from asserting that the tennis court violates 
the restriction agreement for N orthcrest Subdivision (R. 
202). 
If applied by the court below, the doctrine of estop-
pel would become a scattergun doctrine. The court has 
talren conduct not attributable to some of the plaintiffs, 
co1nbined it "~ith other conduct which ha.s invaded no 
one's rights, and used it as a con1plete bar to enforcement 
of rights the plaintiffs thought they had. 
The evidence is undisputed that the Parrish fence is 
on the downhill (not the uphill) side of th:e adjoining 
property; it is a short fence used n1ore as a decoration 
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than anything ,else (Exhibit 17); it was built with the 
concurrence of the uphill neighbor and partly as a con-
cession to him. 
The chain link fence at the rear of the Peterson 
property was built by Peter.son and the adjoining land-
owner as a cooperative project. The f1ence was tempor-
ary and for the purpose of keeping small children from 
being hurt (R. 118-119). It w,as to be remove.d as soon as 
the adjoining landowner w:as able to build a house on his 
now vacant property. 
How can these facts estop the plaintiffs~ Assuming 
the plaintiffs' fences violate the Salt Lake City ordi-
nance, who has been harmed by them~ The only p·ersons 
who might hav;e a right to complain have acquiesced and 
joined in construction and maintenance of the fences. 
The fence·s do not harm defendants, indeed are far re.-
moved from the defendants' property. Defendants. have 
not even claimed to have been adViersly affected by the 
fences. 
It has long been held the pr~v.ate properrty owners 
may use the injunction as a means of enforcing zoning 
ordinances. The ha.sis of the right, howerver, is that 
some special damage, by way ·of diminution in value of 
his property has been or will be suffered by him as a re-
sult of the violation of the particular zoning ordinance~. 
See annotation, "Injunction ,as a Remedy for Violation of 
a Zoning Ordinance," 54 A.L.R. 366, and 129 A.L.R. 885 ; 
2 Metzenbaum's Law of Zoning (2nd Ed.) 1020; 2 Yok-
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ley's Zoning Law and Practice (2nd Ed.) 7; and 58 Am. 
Jur., Zoning§ 189 et seq. 
The basis of the right to enforce zoning ordinances 
is important because of the basis for applying the doc-
trine of estoppel. It is well established that in order to 
apply the doctrine of estoppel a wrong ''must have been 
done to the defendant himself and not to some third 
par~ty." 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 399, p. 99; 
4 A.L.R. 58 (Annotation). If the right to enforce a zoning 
ordinance were based upon the plaintiff's status as a poli-
tical member of the community, rather than upon his 
status as a wronged property owner, it would probably 
be true that any similar violation of the zoning ordinance 
would bar him from maintaining an action to enjoin a 
violation by another. But the right is one based upon 
protection from special damages arising out of violation 
of the ordinance. The plaintiffs have proved special 
damages. There is testimony that the value of their prop-
erties has been dilninished because of the existenee of 
the tennis court and fence. 
With reference to the fences maintaind by plaintiffs, 
there is no sil11ilar testimony. The e"'ridence, in fact, tends 
to show that the fences tend to enhance the yalues of the 
adjoining property and haYe been placed tl1ere "ith the 
advice and consent of the other O\Yners. Defendants have 
claiined no drunage. 
Th·e court's ruling that the partie.s .are estopped from 
asserting that the tennis court is a ·~structure" 'vithin the 
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meaning of the restrictive covenant is erroneous on yet 
another ground. The estoppel in this instance is based 
upon the fact that the plaintiffs Parrish have maint1aine.d 
a high bo.ard fence conne:cted to his house, and that the 
fence is a "structure" if the tennis court is. There is no 
similar finding with respect to anything done or main-
tained by the Petersons. How can the P~arrish fence 
estop the Petersons ~ There is no community of interest, 
though the aetion was properly brought because arising 
out of the same transaction or occurrence. Thus, while 
the P~arrish structu:ve might e.st:op the Parrishes it should 
not estop the Petersons. There is no e,vidence that de-
fendants were misled. The restriction agreement ex-
pressly provides that failure to take action in event of a 
violation shall not be a waiver of the right to enforce as 
against future violations (Exhibit 2, p. 3). From the 
beginning, plaintiffs made known to defendants their 
oppo.sition to the structure. 
CONCLUSION 
Construction of the covenant and ordinance are 
matters of law, not fact. The tennis court and fence 
maintained by defendants violates both the N orthcrest 
Subdivision restriction agreement and the Salt Lake City 
ordinances. The structure was erected and is maintained 
over the strong protest:s of the defendants neighbors. 
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Mor,eover, the existence of the structure has depreciated 
the value of th!e real prope:rties owned by the plaintiffs. 
The estopp·el found by the trial court is "estoppel in the 
air" and is contrary to the doctrine of estoppel as tra~ 
ditionally applie:d. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
and the court directed to enter a decree enj~oining defend-
ants from maintaining the tennis court and the fence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
BRYCE E. ROE 
of Clyde & ·Mecham 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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